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In the YMCA Model Supreme Court of the State of Montana
No. 2008-001
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BEARTOOTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 13,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PHILLIP BRONSON, MITCHELL BRONSON and
WILLIAM BRONSON,
Defendants and Appellants.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This civil lawsuit was filed by Beartooth County School District No. 13. The District sued two members of the senior class at Sky High School, 17-year old twins Mitch and Will Bronson, as well as their father, Phil Bronson, and their mother, Margo R. Kynson. The School District's suit seeks to recover actual and punitive damages for injuries to school property caused by the twins. The twins used two of their father's automatic weapons and fired more than 1000 rounds of ammunition to write what they call a "political message" on a concrete wall on the exterior of the school's gymnasium. Will carved an enormous swastika. Under that, Mitch etched the phrase, "Hate the Haters." They have never offered any explanation of the message.
Mitch and Will are experienced shooters. Both they and their father testified about their expertise. Phil gave them their first rifles at age 6, and they have acquired many new handguns and rifles since. Neither of them own any automatic or semi-automatic weapons, but they have used the ones that belong to their father when practicing at the local firing range. Mitch is President of the local chapter of the Junior Division of Guns Unlimited, and Will is on the national board of directors of Teen Militia, an organization that believes all citizens should own guns to protect both their families from criminals and the country from attack by foreign nations.
Although the twins have spent time shooting with their father, they have spent more time with their mother. Phil has far-flung business interests and travels frequently, so when he and Margo were divorced shortly after the twins were born, they agreed that they would have joint custody, with Margo being the primary residential custodian and Phil having frequent visitation. That worked fine for more than ten years. However, when the twins started high school, Phil gave them keys to his home and allowed them to stay there whenever he was in town. In the past year or so, the twins' relationship with their mother has become strained (because of her new boyfriend according to the twins; because of the twins’ increasingly incorrigible behavior according to Margo). Because of the testy relationship, the twins have spent a majority of their time at Phil's home during their senior year.
On the night they shot up the gymnasium wall, Phil was out of town and the twins were staying with Margo. They left her home about 7:30 p.m., telling her they were going to the library to do research on their bills for Youth and Government. They did go to the library, but then left about 9:30 p.m. and went to Phil's home, where they used their key to get in. They took the automatic weapons and ammunition from the gun cabinet. The gun cabinet was locked, but they had found the key without Phil's knowledge. By 10:30 p.m., they were at the school, and by 10:35, they had completed the swastika and message.
Naturally, the gunfire attracted the attention of neighbors, who called the police. When the police arrived, the twins were waiting calmly. They turned over their weapons and were taken to city hall, where Will called Margo. She was not happy, and refused to bail them out. They spent the night in jail. Phil got back into town the next day and posted bond. Soon after that, he took his friend, the county attorney, on a hunting trip and then the criminal charges against the twins were dropped. Frustrated by the county attorney's refusal to prosecute, the school board decided to file one civil lawsuit against the twins, their mother, and their father to try to recover the $10,000 it cost to repair the building, as well as punitive damages and attorney fees.
The school district's claims against Phil and Margo were brought under Montana Code Annotated §40-6-237, which allows a property owner like the school district to recover damages up to $2,500, plus attorney's fees of $100, "from the parents of any person under the age of 18 years, living with the parents, who shall maliciously or willfully destroy property." The school district's complaint asked for $2,600 per child from each parent, for a total of $10,400. Margo immediately paid her share, $5,200, and asked Judge Thomas Grant to dismiss the claim against her, which the judge did. Phil was not so compliant. He hired a lawyer to represent him and the twins, and went to trial.
The school district's claims against the twins were filed under Montana Code Annotated §41-1-201, which makes a minor civilly liable for wrongs done by him, but not for exemplary or punitive damages unless the minor is "capable of knowing" the actions were wrongful. Judge Grant awarded no actual damages (since the parents were liable for the full cost of the repairs), but did award $5,000 in punitive damages against each of them. In entering that judgment, the court rejected the twins' argument that a punitive damage award under §41-1-201 violates equal protection or Article II, section 15 of the Montana Constitution. The judge made a specific finding, based on the twin's testimony, that the twins believed they were exercising their constitutional right of free speech and did not know their actions were wrongful. However, the judge also found that the twins' exercise of free speech did not excuse their conduct, and because they were "capable of knowing" their actions were wrongful under §41-1-201, they could be liable for punitive damages under that statute.
Both the twins and Phil appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Were the twins "living with" their father as that term is used in Montana Code Annotated §40-6-237 so that he is liable for their malicious or willful destruction of property?
2. Did the trial court's judgment requiring the twins to pay punitive damages under Montana Code Annotated §41-1-201 diminish their rights in violation of Article II, section 15 of the Montana Constitution?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND CASES
Issue I:
Montana Code Ann. §§ 1-2-101, 1-2-102, 1-2-103, 1-2-104, 1-2-105, 1-2-106.
Montana Code Ann. §§ 40-6-237 & 238.
Johnson v. Dempsey, 273 Mont. 26, 901 P.2d 615 (1995).
Gearity v. Salvo, 40 Conn. Supp. 185, 485 A.2d 940 (1984).
Poston v. U.S.F. & G., Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 320 N.W.2d 9 (1982).
Issue 2:
Montana Constitution, Article II, § 4.
Montana Constitution, Article II, § 15.
Montana Code Ann. §§ 1-2-101, 1-2-102, 1-2-103, 1-2-104, 1-2-105, 1-2-106.
Montana Code Ann. §§ 27-1-220 & 221(1), (2) & (5).
Montana Code Ann. § 41-1-201.
Matter of S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 951 P.2d 1365 (1997).
NOTES ON AUTHORITIES:
On Issue 1, Johnson v. Dempsey is the Montana Supreme Court's only case interpreting §§ 40-6-237 & 238, and is controlling authority on the statutes. Effective use of the Johnson decision requires that the facts in that decision and principles applied be compared with or distinguished from the facts and principles presented in the case being argued.
Student attorneys for Phil may focus on the language of § 40-6-237, on the rules of statutory construction found in §§ 1-2-101 & 106, on the statutory definition of "residence" in § 1-1-215, on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Poston, and on the Montana Supreme Court's holding and explanation of the purpose of the statute in the Johnson decision. Student attorneys for the School District may respond by pointing out that the Johnson decision contains mixed messages, and does not address the precise issue raised here, except in a passing comment that favors the School District's position. Furthermore, the term "living with" is not defined in the statute. Whether it means the same as "residing with" depends on the purpose of the statute, which must be "liberally construed ... to effect [its] objects and to promote justice." § 1-2-103. A liberal construction, that could produce a just result here, might be to adopt the Connecticut Supreme Court's rule that "control of the minor" is the determining factor in imposing liability.
Issue 2 involves exemplary damages, which are also called punitive damages. As the terms imply, punitive or exemplary damages are intended to punish wrongdoers and to make an example to others to discourage inappropriate conduct. The issue presents two sub-issues. One, did the trial judge impose punitive damages against the twins for conduct that could not have been punished if committed by an adult? Two, if so, does that violate Article II, section 15 of the Montana Constitution?
The first sub-issue arises because there are differences between the language of the punitive damage statutes that apply to adults (§§ 27-1-220 & 221), and the language of the statute under which minors can be liable for exemplary damages (§ 41-1-201). To be liable for punitive damages for damaging property under §27-1-220, an adult must have acted with "actual malice," which means a conscious disregard of or deliberate indifference to a high probability of injury to another. Mont. Code Ann. §27-1-221(2). Section 41-1-201 allows a minors to be liable for punitive damages if they are "capable of knowing" their actions were wrong. The linguistic differences between those statutes have not been explored in decisions from any court, so Student attorneys for the twins and the School District will have to do their own analyses, assisted by the rules of statutory construction in §§ 1-2-101 through 106.
On the second sub-issue, the most important authorities are Article II, section 15, and the Montana Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of that constitutional provision in Matter of S.L.M. Student attorneys for the twins may argue that the "capable of knowing" standard in § 41-1-201 enhances the punishment of juveniles and is unconstitutional, just as the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act that was at issue in Matter of S.L.M. was unconstitutional because it increased the sanctions that could be imposed on juvenile offenders beyond those that could be imposed on adults. Student attorneys for the School District may respond that § 41-1-201 does not displace the standards for imposing punitive damages in §§ 27-1-220 & 221, but merely supplements them, imposing the additional requirement that the minors be "capable of knowing" their acts were wrongful before punitive damages can be imposed against them, since minors are under a legal disability and cannot take care of themselves. Thus, one can argue that § 41-1-201 really does enhance the protection of minors, and does not violate Article II, section 15. (Of course, there is some question whether the trial judge actually enhanced or diminished the protections for the twins in this case.) Student attorneys for the School District also may argue that Matter of S.L.M. is distinguishable because it was a criminal case in which the punishment was imprisonment, a restriction on liberty that requires strict scrutiny, whereas no restriction on liberty was imposed on the twins.